Recently an orthogonal state based protocol of direct quantum communication without actual transmission of particles is proposed by Salih et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 110 (2013) 170502] using chained quantum Zeno effect. As the no-transmission of particle claim is criticized by Vaidman [arXiv:1304.6689 (2013], the condition (claim) of Salih et al. is weaken here to the extent that transmission of particles is allowed, but transmission of the message qubits (the qubits on which the secret information is encoded) is not allowed. Remaining within this weaker condition it is shown that there exists a large class of quantum states, that can be used to implement an orthogonal state based protocol of secure direct quantum communication using entanglement swapping, where actual transmission of the message qubits is not required. The security of the protocol originates from monogamy of entanglement. As the protocol can be implemented without using conjugate coding its security is independent of non-commutativity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The need of secrecy is eternal. From the beginning of human civilization several methods of secure communication have been proposed and implemented. However, until the appearance of quantum cryptography, none of the methods/protocols of secure communication was unconditionally secure. First ever unconditionally secure protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) was introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1] . Since this pioneering work on quantum cryptography several other protocols of secure quantum communication have been proposed to date. Interestingly, applicability of all the early protocols of secure quantum communication [1] [2] [3] [4] , were limited to QKD. However, it was realized very soon that quantum states can be employed for other more general cryptographic tasks, too. For example, in 1999 Hillery et al. introduced a protocol for quantum secret sharing (QSS) of classical secrets [5] . Almost simultaneously, a protocol for deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC) was proposed by Shimizu and Imoto [6] . Eventually the protocol of Shimizu and Imoto was found to be insecure in its original form. However, it suggested that there may exists a protocol of quantum communication that can circumvent prior generation of keys (i.e., QKD) and thus it may lead to unconditionally secure direct quantum communication. Subsequently, many such protocols have been proposed. Such protocols can broadly be divided into two classes: (a) protocols for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [7] [8] [9] [10] and (b) protocols for DSQC [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] .
In a secure direct quantum communication protocol if receiver (Bob) requires a pre-key to read out the secret message sent by the sender (Alice) then the protocol is referred to as DSQC protocol, otherwise (i.e., if no such pre-key is required) the protocol is referred to as QSDC protocol. Specifically, in a DSQC protocol Bob can decode the secret message sent by Alice only after receipt of additional classical information of at least one bit for each qubit transmitted by Alice [19] . In the present paper we aim to design a new orthogonal state based DSQC protocol. Before we do so it would be interesting to note that all DSQC protocols can be transformed to protocols of QKD. It is easy to convert a QSDC/DSQC protocol into a protocol of QKD by using a random number generator. Specifically, if we assume that the sender (Alice) possesses a random number generator and she transmits the outcome of the random number generator to Bob, then any QSDC/DSQC protocol would reduce to a protocol of QKD. Thus if we can establish that an orthogonal state based DSQC protocol can be realized by using any member of a family of quantum states, then that would imply that QKD can also be realized using these quantum states. Further, in a conventional QKD protocol we generate an unconditionally secure key by quantum means and subsequently use classical cryptographic resources to encode the secret message. No such classical means are required in DSQC and QSDC. This makes these protocols purely quantum mechanical.
The unconditional security of majority of the existing protocols of DSQC, QSDC and QKD arise from the conjugate coding. Only recently we have shown that conjugate coding is not essential for DSQC [20, 21] . Subsequently, Salih et al. have also proposed an orthogonal state based protocol of DSQC [22] . Here we provide another orthogonal state based protocol of DSQC. The protocol presented here is a Goldenberg-Vaidman (GV) type [4] protocol of DSQC, that uses only orthogonal states for encoding, decoding and error checking, as was done in the original GV protocol of QKD. Interestingly, GV protocol was introduced in 1995, but for many years it remained isolated as the only orthogonal-state-based protocol of QKD. Finally in 2009 another orthogonal state based protocol known as N09 protocol [23] was proposed by T.-G. Noh. These two orthogonal state based protocols are fundamentally different from the other conjugate coding based (BB84 type) protocols for several reasons. Most importantly, security of these two protocols does not depend on noncommutativity. Consequently, they are extremely important from the foundational perspectives. Importance of orthogonal-state-based protocols are not limited to foundational aspects only, they are also of practical importance as they are experimentally realizable [24] [25] [26] [27] . To be precise, recently GV protocol is experimentally realized [24] . A set of successful implementation of N09 protocol are also reported [25] [26] [27] . The foundational importance and the recent experimental achievements have motivated us to investigate the power of orthogonal state based protocols from various aspects. Recently, we have shown that the security of both GV and N09 protocols arise from duality [20] . We have also generalized the GV protocol to GV-type DSQC and QSDC protocols. Our Bell-state-based generalizations of original GV protocol may also be regarded as the first instance of GV-type DSQC and QSDC protocols [20] . We have also shown that maximally efficient orthogonal state based protocol of DSQC and QSDC can be designed with arbitrary quantum states [21] . The foundational importance and the recent experimental achievements have also motivated others to generalize N09 protocol to a protocol of secure direct quantum communication. To be precise, recently Salih et al. have provided a very interesting protocol of direct counterfactual quantum communication [22] using chained quantum Zeno effect. They claimed that direct quantum communication between Alice and Bob is possible without actual transmission of particles between them. This claim is criticized by Vaidman [28] , who argued that actual measurement of the presence of the qubits in transmission channel contradicts the claim of Salih et al. The argument of Vaidman motivates us to weaken the claim of Salih et al. (i.e., the condition imposed by Salih et al.) and to investigate the possibility of designing a protocol of DSQC under the condition that transmission of particles are allowed but transmission of information encoded qubits are not allowed. This condition is referred to as weak condition. Remaining within this weak condition we have proposed an entanglement swapping based protocol of DSQC.
In the protocol proposed in this paper, the rearrangement of order of particles, plays an important role. DSQC protocol based on this technique was first proposed by Zhu et al. [16] [21] , and the Tsai et al. protocol utilizes the dense coding of four-qubit cluster states. In all these protocols the qubits on which Alice encodes a message travel through the quantum channel. In contrast, no such transmission happens in recently proposed Zhang et al. [32] protocol and Salih et al. protocol [22] . Extending their ideas [22, 32] we aim to show that there exists a class of quantum states that may be used to implement GV type protocol of DSQC that would be free from transmission of information encoded qubits.
The remaining part of the present paper is organized as follows, in Section II we describe the general form of a set of quantum states that may be used for DSQC using entanglement swapping. In this section it is indicated that this set of quantum states can be used to design entanglement swapping based protocol of DSQC. A set of well known quantum states are also shown to be member of this set of quantum states. In Section III, we describe a general GV type orthogonal state based protocol of DSQC that can be implemented using any quantum state of the family described in Section II. An explicit example of the protocol is also provided using GHZ-like state. In Section IV security and efficiency of the protocol is discussed and finally the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. GENERAL FORM OF THE QUANTUM STATE
We are interested to design a protocol of DSQC that can transmit an n-bit message using the quantum states of the form
where {|e i } is a basis set in C 2 m : m ≥ n and each of the basis vector is m qubit maximally entangled state (consequently, m ≥ 2), and {|f i } is a basis set in C 2 l : l ≥ n ≥ 1. It is not essential for the basis elements of {|f i } to be in entangled state. Thus |ψ is a m + l qubit state. Since {|e i } and {|f i } are basis set, i = i ′ implies that |e i = |e i ′ and |f i = |f i ′ . This in turn ensures that |ψ is an entangled state. In general we demand |e i as maximally entangled m-qubit state. However, for the convenience of proof we restrict ourselves to a specific case where |e i is a m-qubit cat state. Now we assume that the quantum state |ψ described in (1) is prepared by Alice. She keeps first m qubits with herself and sends the remaining l qubits to Bob in a nonclonable manner. By non-clonable manner we mean that Alice sends the qubits to Bob in such a way that Eve cannot clone the state |f i . Meaning of this will be elaborated in what follows. Further, imagine that Alice has prepared another cat state |e j of same dimension, then the combined state |e j ⊗ |ψ can be expressed as
(2) In what follows we will see that Alice encodes a secret j by creating |e j . Thus the index j corresponds to a secret bit string indexed by j. From (2), it is clear that in |ψ 1 the first m qubits (i.e., the qubits of |e j ) are separable from the rest of the qubits. Consequently, any measurement on rest of the qubits will not reveal any information about the state of the first m qubits. Let us see what happens if we allow Alice to do entanglement swapping among first 2m qubits of this combined state (2) . Specifically, we are interested to see the effect of entanglement swapping on |e j |e i . To do so, Alice may follow the following prescription. She takes first p = m 2 qubits from both the cat states (i.e., |e j and |e i ) if m is even, otherwise she takes p = m−1 2 qubits from both |e j and |e i . Thus Alice has a set of 2p qubits (this set is referred to as first set) and another set of 2 (m − p) qubits (this set is referred to as second set).
Before we proceed further, the notations used here can be made more precise using the convention used in [33] . Following [33] we can express an m-qubit cat sate in general as
where the symbols u k stands for binary variable ∈ {0, 1} with u c k = 1 − u k . The state of our interest (2) is a finite superposition of products of two cat states. Let each of these cat sates be labeled by q, where q = 1, 2, and the kth particle of the lth cat state is labeled by k(l). This summarizes the notation used here. Now it is straightforward to recognize that the set of all cat states of 2p qubits forms a complete orthonormal basis set and using the notation described here the elements of such a basis set can be expressed as
Now we imagine that Alice performs a projective measurement on the first set of qubits using cat basis of 2p dimension. The measurement on this basis implies that we operate |ψ(2p) ψ(2p)| on |ψ 1 . The operation would collapse the first set of qubits into one of the cat states in 2p dimension. Remaining (2m − 2p) qubits of |e j |e i will be projected to a (2m − 2p) cat state of the form [33] 
The structure of (2) would ensure that the initial entanglement present between |e i and |f i (more precisely between first m particles and last l particles of |ψ ) is now transferred between the (2m − 2p) particles of |ψ(2m − 2p) and l particles of |f i . Now if we consider a protocol in which Alice sends the last l qubits (i.e., qubits of |f i ) to Bob and measures the first 2p qubits in 2p-qubit cat basis and the remaining (2m − 2p) qubits of her possession in (2m − 2p)-qubit cat basis and announces the outcomes, then Bob will be able to infer what was |e j (equivalently the secret encoded by Alice which is indexed by j) by measuring his qubits in {|f i } basis and using the outcomes of Alice's measurement. Thus it leads to a protocol of direct quantum communication.
At a first glance any protocol designed along the above line of arguments does not appear to be secure as {|f i } is orthogonal and measurement outcomes of Alice are public knowledge. Conventionally, orthogonal states can be perfectly measured and thus cloned. A measurement by Eve in {|f i } basis will destroy the entanglement, but Alice and Bob will not be able to trace Eve if they apply the above idea without using any strategy for eavesdropping check. Further, if Eve is allowed to measure the states communicated by Alice in {|f i } basis then she is also capable to clone the states [34] and the protocol would fail. However, it is possible to design strategy in which orthogonal states are communicated in such a way that Eve does not have access to the basis set in which the communicated states are basis elements (i.e., the basis set in which the communicated states are perfectly measurable). This restriction on the basis sets available to Eve implies nocloning [34] and when orthogonal states are communicated using such a strategy then we say that the states are communicated in a non-clonable manner. To communicate the orthogonal states of {|f i } basis in a non-clonable manner we need to ensure that Eve does not have access to {|f i } basis. This is possible in several ways. For example, non-clonable communication is possible if the physical realization of all the states in {|f i } basis are such that they may be visualized as superposition of two or more pieces that can be geographically separated. For example, in the original GV protocol [4] , orthogonal states |φ 0 = |a + |b and |φ 1 = |a − |b are used to communicate bit values 0 and 1, respectively, but Alice used to send the wave packet |b to Bob only after wavepacket |a is received by Bob. This strategy implies that Eve does not have simultaneous access to |a and |b and as a consequence Eve cannot perform a measurement in {|a + |b , |a − |b } basis. Eve's inability to perform a measurement in {|a +|b , |a −|b } basis implies that she can neither do a perfect measurement nor perform cloning operation [34] . Thus in the GV protocol orthogonal states are communicated in a non-clonable manner. We are not interested to follow original GV idea to communicate |f i in a non-clonable manner as GV idea requires strict time checking which is difficult to achieve experimentally. Some of the present authors [20, 21] have recently generalized the GV idea and have suggested another strategy of non-clonable communica-tion of orthogonal states by using the fact that entangled states are nothing but superposition in tensor product space. In our procedure strict time checking is not required [20] . To be precise, Alice can concatenate a set of decoy qubits prepared in Bell states (say Alice prepares |ψ
) with a N -qubit string that she wants to transmit to Bob and randomly rearrange the particle ordering i.e., apply PoP technique and thus restrict the basis available to Eve. PoP will ensure that Eve cannot clone or measure the decoy qubits as she does not know which qubits are mutually entangled. Further Eve will not be able to selectively clone or measure non-decoy qubits as after application of PoP, she has no way to isolate decoy qubits from the other qubits.
As perfect measurement by Eve is not possible due to unavailability of {|f i } basis, any measurement and/or cloning attempt by Eve will leave a signature, that can be traced by measuring and comparing the decoy qubits. In summary, Alice can always communicate last l qubits of (1) to Bob in a non-clonable manner and that in turn ensures protection against measurement and resend attack and cloning (CNOT) attack. Above facts lead us to a protocol of DSQC using entanglement swapping where actual transmission of the information encoded particles are not required. The protocol is elaborated on Section III.
A. Some special cases of the quantum state
Till now it may not be very easy to visualize: How general the state (1) is? So here we note some special cases of this general state (1) . Let us start with the simplest case m = 2, n = 1 and l = 1. For m = 2, the obvious choice of maximally entangled basis set is Bell basis {|e i } = {|ψ + , |ψ − , |φ + , |φ − }, where
. For n = 1, we need only 2 basis vectors from the set {|e i }. Let us choose |e 1 = |ψ + , |e 2 = |ψ − , now if we choose |f 1 = |0 and
, which is a GHZ-like state [35] . Here we can easily recognize that all GHZ-like states are actually of the form (1). Alternatively, if we choose |e 1 = |ψ + , |e 2 = |ψ − and |f 1 = |+ and |f 2 = |− , then |ψ =
(|000 + |111 ), which is a GHZ state. Similarly we can show that all other GHZ states are also of the form (1). In the Table I we have provided some more examples of well known quantum states which are of the form (1). Thus if we can show that (1) can be used for DSQC of n−bit classical information then that would mean that we have a large class of states that can be used for DSQC without actual transmission of message encoded states.
III. ORTHOGONAL STATE BASED PROTOCOL OF DSQC
The protocol in general works as follows:
Step 1: Alice prepares |ψ ⊗N . She keeps the first m qubits of each |ψ with herself and prepares a sequence P B with the remaining l qubits. Thus P B is a sequence of N l qubits.
Step 2: Alice communicates P B to Bob in a nonclonable manner. To communicate P B in nonclonable manner Alice prepares |ψ
as decoy (checking) qubits and concatenates the qubits into P B to obtain a longer sequence P ′ B , which has total 2N l qubits. Subsequently, Alice applies a random permutation operator Π 2N l on P ′ B to obtain a new sequence P ′′ B = Π 2N l P ′ B and sends that to Bob.
Step 3: Alice discloses Π 2N l (which includes the coordinates of the Bell pairs) after receiving authentic acknowledgment of receipt of all the photons from Bob.
Step 4: Bob rearranges the sequence and measures the transmitted Bell pairs (that are prepared as decoy qubits) in the Bell basis to determine if they are in the state |ψ + . If the error detected by Bob is within a tolerable limit, they continue to the next step. Otherwise, they discard the protocol and restart from Step 1.
Step 5: Alice encodes her n-bit message as follows:
She encodes 0 1 0 2 · · · 0 n , 0 1 0 2 · · · 1 n , · · · , 1 1 1 2 · · · 1 n as |e 1 , |e 2 , · · · , |e n respectively and combines the encoded state with |ψ . Now if Alice encodes a secret message j then the complete state of the system is
whose first 2m qubits are with Alice and the last l qubits are with Bob.
Step 6: Alice performs entanglement swapping operation as described above (see Section II) and announces her measurement outcomes.
Step 7: Bob measures his qubits in {|f i } basis. From his measurement outcomes and from the announcement of Alice, he can decode the information encoded by Alice.
A. A special case: Implementation of the protocol using GHZ-like state
Assume that Alice and Bob have agreed on the following encoding. If Alice has to send 0 (1) then she will encode it as |ψ + (|ψ − ).
1. Alice prepares N copies of a GHZ-like state 4. Bob rearranges the sequence and measures the transmitted Bell pairs in the Bell basis to determine if they are in the state |ψ + . If the error detected is within the tolerable limit, they continue to the next step. Otherwise, they discard the protocol and restart from Step 1.
After confirmation that no eavesdropping has
happened, Alice encodes her message qubit. Now the complete state of the system is
Here the qubits 1-4 are with Alice and the last qubit is with Bob.
6. Now Alice does Bell measurements on qubits 1,3 and 2,4 and announces her result.
7. Bob measures his qubit in computational basis. Using his measurement outcome and the announcement of Alice, he can decode the information encoded by Alice.
Let's see how Bob can decode the information. First we assume that Alice has encoded 0, then the combined state can be decomposed as
Similarly, if Alice encodes 1, then the combined state is
Now from the above two equations it is clear that using the announcement of measurement outcomes of Alice and the outcome of his own measurement Bob will be able to decode the encoded information. For clarity we have shown the relation among Alice's measurement outcomes, Bob's measurement outcomes and Bob's conclusions in Table II . Similar expansion and subsequently tables relating Alice's outcome, Bob's outcome and encoded bit string can be obtained for other quantum states of the generic form (1). For example, we can easily obtain such tables for all other quantum states listed in Table I .
(1, 2, 1) {|ψ
Brown state after swapping of particles 7.
(2, 2, 2) Table I : Interesting quantum states of the form (1). Here
IV. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE PROTOCOL
In this protocol the qubits with encoded message are not transmitted, so we just need to ensure that the first transmission (i.e., the transmission of l qubits of |f i to Bob) is secure. As described above, while sending this set of qubits Alice randomly inserts the decoy qubits prepared in |ψ + ⊗ N l 2 and subsequently on Alice's disclosure of position of those qubits Bob can measure them in Bell basis and check what % of them are still in |ψ + and use that to compute the error rate. Now we check the protection of the protocol against some well known eavesdropping strategies.
Measurement and resend attack: If Eve plans to measure the qubits of P ′′ B and send the outcome to Bob, she will always leave a signature as she does not know which qubits are entangled with which one. As Eve has no way to distinguish between decoy qubits and the other qubits she will end up measuring decoy qubits, clearly any attempt to measure the decoy qubits in a basis other than Bell basis will destroy/modify the entanglement and will be traced when Bob measures them. Even if Eve measures in Bell basis, she will be traced. This can be visualized through a simple example. Consider that Eve measures decoy qubits |ψ 
Alice's outcome Bob's outcome Encoded bit CNOT (Cloning) attack: PoP ensures that Eve does not have access to Bell basis. So she cannot try to clone in Bell basis. However she may try to apply CNOT gate and use each transmitted qubit as control qubit and prepare target qubits in |0 . In such a case her operation will lead to a decoy state |ψ
where last two qubits are the auxiliary qubits introduced by Eve. Now 50% of the time Bob's measurement will yield |ψ − and Eve will be detected. It is important to note that this is applicable in general independent of whether elements of {|f i } are entangled or separable as Eve has no way to distinguish between a decoy qubit and other qubits so she cannot selectively clone.
Capture and replacement attack: In principle Eve can capture all the qubits sent by Alice and prepare fake states |ψ =
2 and use them to prepare a fake P ′′ B . This strategy would fail as the permutation operator randomly rearranges the qubits, so while Bob will recreate the sequence after Alices's disclosure of Π N l he will obtain a sequence that is not same as what was prepared by Eve after concatenating |ψ + ⊗ N l 2 to P B . As a consequence Bob's measuremet outcomes will not always be |ψ + . We have seen that the protocol is protected against several eavesdropping attacks. This is expected as the strategy adopted here restricts the basis set available to Eve. Further, we would like to note that announcements made by Alice do not disclose any information. This can be visualized quickly if we note that |f i can be found in 2 n different states and as Eve is completely unaware of |f i , her ignorance is of log 2 2 n = n bits which is the same as the amount of information encoded through |e j . Thus Alice's disclosure does not reduce the uncertainty of Eve. In the existing entanglement swapping based DSQC protocols [36] conjugate coding based techniques that rely on BB84 kind of eavesdropping checking are used. Thus the security of those protocols essentially arise from noncommutativity. In contrast to the existing protocols our protocol is completely orthogonal state based (GV type) protocol and its security arises from monogamy [20, 21] .
Qubit efficiency η is used for analysis of efficiency of DSQC and QSDC protocols. It is defined as [37] 
where c denotes the total number of transmitted classical bits (message bits), q denotes the total number of qubits used and b is the number of classical bits exchanged for decoding of the message (classical communications used for checking of eavesdropping is not counted). In our case |ψ is a m + l qubit state and in addition we need to add l decoy qubits [29] and m qubits for entanglement swapping. So q = 2m + 2l. Now this state can be used to communicate n bit of classical information which implies c = n. In addition Alice has to disclose her measurement outcomes by transmitting 2m bit classical information. Therefore
Now in the limiting case when m = n = l then the qubit efficiency η = 1 6 = 16.6% is maximum but this value is lower compared to the maximum possible value of η = 1 3 = 33.33% [29] . The difference arises from the definition of q, if instead of total number of qubits we use q = total number of qubits transmitted then in the limiting case m = n = l the efficiency of the proposed protocol is 25%. Still its not maximally efficient. Thus the most interesting feature of the present protocol that the message encoded states are not transmitted is associated with a cost as it reduces the efficiency.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is shown that DSQC is possible without actual transmission of message string and the task can be performed with any member of a set of quantum states having generic form (1) . The proposed protocol is based on Bose et al.'s idea of generalized entanglement swapping [33] , and it is a GV-type orthogonal state based protocol of DSQC. We have also elaborated the working of the protocol by considering a special case where the initial state is a GHZ-like state. The protocol is different from most of the conventional DSQC protocols for the following three reasons: (1) It is an orthogonal state based protocol and except our recent proposals [20, 21] and Salih et al. protocol [22] all other existing protocols of DSQC are based on conjugate coding. (2) In the proposed protocol actual information encoded quantum state never propagates through the transmission channel. (3) Whereas the security of conventional QSDC and DSQC protocols, like that of BB84-class QKD protocols, is based on conjugate coding, the security of the present GV-type DSQC protocols is based on monogamy of entanglement.
Present work provides a protocol of DSQC that is similar to the protocol of Salih et al. in the sense that its security does not arise from noncommutativity and message qubits are not transmitted. Interestingly, criticism of Vaidman is not applicable to the present protocol as transmission of non-message qubits happens in the present protocol and thus it works in a weaker condition than that claimed by Salih et al. [22] . Further, recently proposed Zhang et al. [32] protocol may be viewed as a special case of our protocol. This point is explicitly illustrated through Example 2 of Table I where we show that the 4-qubit cluster state used by Zhang et al. is a special case of the quantum state (1). The state described here and the proposed protocol is much more general. In Table I , we have provided 8 examples of quantum state of the form (1) that may be used for implementation of DSQC using the protocol presented here. The list can be extended arbitrarily as we can generate infinitely many quantum states of the form (1). However, a protocol is useful if and only if that can be implemented using the quantum states that can be generated experimentally using the contemporary facilities. Interestingly, all the states listed in Table I can be generated in modern laboratories and their generations are reported in recent past.
The protocol is shown to be unconditionally secure. It is also noted that the security of the protocol arises from non-realistic nature of quantum mechanics. Interestingly it is found that the protocol is not maximally efficient as far as its qubit efficiency is considered. This interesting and completely orthogonal state based protocol is expected to be of much use in all future experimental developments as it provides a wide choice of quantum states to experimentalists.
